Western New England University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2022

South Korea Shatters the Paradigm: Corporate Liability, Historical
Accountability, and the Second World War
Timothy Webster

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons

South Korea ShatterS the Paradigm:
CorPorate LiabiLity, hiStoriCaL
aCCountabiLity, and the SeCond WorLd War

Timothy Webster*

AbstrAct
South Korea is currently revising its interpretation of Japanese
colonialism, and the fallout from World War II more generally. In 2018,
the Supreme Court of South Korea issued two opinions that staked new
ground in this process of legal revision. First, by holding Japanese
multinational enterprises legally liable for events that took place in the
early 20th century, the verdicts fissure a wall of corporate impunity
that courts in Japan, the United States and many Western jurisdictions
have erected over the past three decades. Second, by situating the
decisions within Korea’s own colonial past, the judgments advance a
post-colonial jurisprudence that many scholars have long discussed, but
few judgments have actually explored. In particular, the narrative of
colonial illegality—accepted by some scholars, but relatively few judges—may finally make inroads into the jurisprudence of economically
developed countries. Third, just as repairing colonialism has come to
the fore in contemporary debates of law, politics and society, issues of
World War II liability—legal, financial, historical, and otherwise—will
likely face revisions in the years to come.
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IntroductIon
Repairing the past is a theme for our time. As the United States
reviews linkages between contemporary forms of racial injustice
and the institution of slavery,1 France is sending back dozens of artifacts seized from former African colonies.2 Even England, the largest
imperial power, apologized and compensated thousands of Kenyans
brutalized during its suppression of the Mau Mau Rebellion.3 By linking current inequality to historical suppression, victims make a case for
compensation in the present moment. The sins of the past do not disappear. Instead, they compound interest, sometimes for decades, before
the principal becomes due.
Few phenomena wreak more destruction than war. One way
to conceive of the vast devastation occasioned by World War II is to
reflect on the breadth and depth of contemporary reparations movements. Victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, ably
assisted by civil society organizations, lawyers, and historians, have
1.
Katanga Johnson, U.S. Public More Aware of Racial Inequality But Still Re
jects Reparations: Reuters/Ipsos Polling, Reuters (June 25, 2020, 4:03 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-reparations-poll/u-s-public-more-aware-of
racial-inequality-but-still-rejects-reparations-reuters-ipsos-polling-idUSKBN23W1NG
[https://perma.cc/233F-EUQA].
2.
Anna Sansom, France’s National Assembly Votes to Return Colonial-era Artefacts to Benin and Senegal, Art Newspaper (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.theartnewspaper.
com/news/france-s-national-assembly-votes-to-return-colonial-era-artefacts-to-benin-and
senegal [https://perma.cc/827W-34MU] (describing several individual laws that France has
passed to repatriate art, weapons, and human remains to former colonies).
3.
Caroline Elkins, Britain Has Said Sorry to the Mau Mau.The Rest of the Empire Is
Still Waiting, Guardian (June 7, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
jun/06/britain-maumau-empire-waiting [https://perma.cc/9KTZ-69MH] (describing Brit
ain’s apology, acknowledgment of the use of torture, and compensatory payments of £2,600
to ethnic Kikuyus).
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demanded redress in Europe, Asia, and the United States. They have
queried lawmakers, beseeched executive officials, and filed hundreds
of lawsuits.4 In some instances—notably in the West—these efforts
have yielded national laws, compensatory mechanisms, charitable
foundations, and claims tribunals to restitute stolen property.5 But in
other cases—notably in East Asia—there is little to show for reparative efforts.
Yet, South Korean courts are writing a new chapter in the reparative saga. In January 2021, a trial court in Seoul ordered the Japanese
government to pay 100 million won (roughly $90,000) to each of a
dozen Korean women forced into sexual slavery during the War.6 In
April 2021, a different trial court arrived at the opposite conclusion,
inoculating the Japanese government under the theory of state immunity.7 And in June 2021, another Korean court dismissed a case brought
against sixteen Japanese corporations that used forced labor during the
war.8 These lawsuits, as well as their contradictory outcomes, suggest
that a comprehensive resolution of the war reparations issue remains a
distant improbability.
4.
Most of the English-language material on World War II reparations focuses on
developments in the West. See, e.g., Leora Bilsky, The Holocaust, Corporations, and
the Law: Unfinished Business (2017) (arguing that the transnational Holocaust litigation
movement yielded compensation, but failed to provide normative clarification for corpo
rate liability); Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its Legacy
(Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2005) (discussing lawsuits in the United States
and the various international agreements the lawsuits yielded); Michael J. Bazyler, Holo
caust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts (2003). Professor Bazyler
calls the “American justice system” the “real hero” of the story because, inter alia, foreign
citizens can file suit in the United States for human rights abuses that occurred abroad,
U.S. courts exert jurisdiction over foreign companies that do business in the United States
(even if the conduct took place elsewhere), American legal culture allows attorneys to take
high-risk cases on a contingency see basis, filing casts are relatively low, and judges act inde
pendently of government pressure. Id. at xi-xiii.
5.
Michael Bazyler, Holocaust, Genocide & The Law: A Quest for Justice in
a Post-Holocaust World 161–68 (2017) (describing the results of the transatlantic Holo
caust restitution movement)
6.
Choe Sang-Hun, South Korean Court Orders Japan to Pay Compensation for
Wartime Sexual Slavery, N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/
world/asia/south-korea-comfort-women-japan.html [https://perma.cc/Y5K3-D59D].
7.
Hyonhee Shin, S. Korea Court Dismisses ‘Comfort Women’ Lawsuit, Contradicts
Earlier Ruling, Reuters (Apr. 20, 2021, 10:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/
skorea-court-dismisses-comfort-women-lawsuit-contradicts-earlier-ruling-2021-04-21/
[https://perma.cc/WR3R-GHUC].
8.
Hyonhee Shin, South Korea Court Dismisses Forced Labour Case Against
Japanese Firms, Reuters (June 7, 2021, 2:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/asiapacific/south-korea-court-dismisses-forced-labour-case-against-japanese-firms-2021-06-07/
[https://perma.cc/7VAP-52G2].
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These lower court decisions follow a pair of verdicts rendered
by the Supreme Court of South Korea (SCSK) to compensate victims of other wartime human rights abuses. On October 30, 2018, the
SCSK ordered Nippon Steel-Sumitomo to pay 100 million Korean
won (roughly $90,000) each to four former forced laborers, including
98-year-old Yi Chun-shik, the sole surviving plaintiff.9 On November 29, 2018, the SCSK likewise ordered Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(MHI) to pay 400 million won (roughly $365,500) to ten plaintiffs
in a consolidated lawsuit.10 Both SCSK verdicts stem from a pair of
2012 decisions wherein the Court held that these Japanese companies committed “torts against humanity” against Korean citizens.11 At
the time of this writing, at least a dozen other civil cases, with hundreds of plaintiffs, are wending their way through trial and appellate
courts in Busan, Gwangju, Seoul, and Taegu. If past is precedent,
these plaintiffs may well prevail, though whether any Korean victim
will live long enough to see the enforcement of these judgments is
another matter entirely. The Japanese corporate defendants, like the
Japanese government in the 2021 “comfort women” decision, have
indicated that they have no intention of paying the damages award.12
9.
Hyonhee Shin, Friction Likely as Korean Court Orders Nippon Steel to Com
pensate WWII Workers, Reuters (Oct. 29, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-southkorea-japan-laborers-idUSKCN1N32TS [https://perma.cc/3HVH-WHLJ]; Shin
Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel-Sumitomo Metal Corp., Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], Oct. 30, 2018,
2013Da61381 [hereinafter SCSK Opinion]. The decision has been translated into English.
See Seokwoo Lee & Seryon Lee, Decision of the Korean Court on Japanese Forced Labor
re New Nippon Steel Corporation (Supreme Court, Case 2013 Da 61381, Final Judgment), 7
Korean J. Int’l & Compar. L. 88 (2019) [hereinafter SCSK Translation].
10. Simon Denyer, New South Korea Court Ruling Angers Japan, Deepening Crisis
Between America’s Closest Pacific Allies, Washington Post (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/s-korea-court-orders-japans-mitsubishi-to-pay-compensation
for-wartime-forced-labor/2018/11/28/4f0a6616-f37e-11e8-9240-e8028a62c722_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6C89-GLSC]. Pak Chang-hwan v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., [S. Ct.], Nov.
29, 2018, 2013Da67587.
11. See Pak Chang-hwan v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], May
24, 2012, 2009Da22549, rev’g Busan Godeungbeobwon [Busan High Ct.], Feb. 3, 2009,
2007Na4288, aff’g Busan Jibangbeobwon [Busan Dist. Ct.], Feb. 2, 2007, 2000Gajap7960;
Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel-Sumitomo Metal Corp., Daebeobwon [S. Ct.] May 24, 2012,
2009Da68620 (S. Kor.).
12. See Regarding the Confirmation of the Judgment of the Seoul Central District
Court of the Republic of Korean in the Lawsuit Filed by Former Comfort Women and Others
(Statement by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Ministry of Foreign Affs. of Japan
(Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/danwa/press6e_000269.html [https://perma.
cc/7QVP-VFAC] (indicating the Japanese government “has repeatedly expressed its po
sition that this lawsuit therefore must be dismissed”). Because the Japanese companies
have refused to pay the damages awards, the South Korean judiciary has begun the process
of seizing assets that the companies own in South Korea. See Nippon Steel Appeals South
Korean Court-Ordered Asset Seizure, Nikkei Asia (Aug. 7, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/
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The verdicts have been widely credited with bringing bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan to their lowest point in fifty
years.13 Given the enmity that frequently surfaces between Korea and
Japan, that is quite a feat.
It is too early to tell whether the verdicts will lead to another bilateral agreement, similar to the 2015 comfort women agreement infelicitously
hammered out by the Japanese and Korean governments.14 Nevertheless,
the importance of these judgments cannot be underestimated. Civil reparations lawsuits have previously been filed in Germany,15 France,16 Austria,17
Spotlight/Japan-South-Korea-rift/Nippon-Steel-appeals-South-Korean-court-ordered-as
set-seizure [https://perma.cc/L7YZ-SEM5].
13. Choe Sang-Hun, Ex-Chief Justice of South Korea Is Arrested on Case-Rigging
Charges, N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/asia/south
korea-chief-justice-japan.html [https://perma.cc/9NU9-6N4D] (“Relations between Seoul
and Tokyo have plummeted to their worst point in years after the South Korean Supreme
Court ruled last fall that Korean victims of forced labor . . . had the right to seek damages
from wartime employers, including Japanese industrial giants.”).
14. See Full Text of Announcement on ‘Comfort Women’ Issue by Japanese, South
Korean Foreign Ministers, Japan Times (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/12/28/national/politics-diplomacy/full-text-announcement-comfort-women
issue-japanese-south-korean-foreign-ministers/ [https://perma.cc/K7C6-WTHK]. “Com
fort women” refers to women and girls that the Japanese army forced into sexual slavery
during WWII. The 2015 agreement included an apology from the Japanese foreign minister
to the South Korean comfort women, payment from Japan of roughly $8 million to create
a fund for the surviving women, a pledge from South Korea to address the comfort “girl”
statue placed in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, and a mutual agreement to refrain
from criticizing the other party’s handling of the issue in the international community.
15. Krakauer v. Germany, Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Nov. 5, 1997, 1*134/92
(finding in favor of forced laborers against German government), rev’d Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dec. 3, 1998 (dismissing claims as time-barred). The Ger
man cases are discussed at length in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J.
1999).
16. See, e.g., Georges Lipietz v. Prefect of Haute-Garonne and Société Nationale
des Chemins de fer Français, Tribunal administratif [TA] [administrative tribunal] Tou
louse, June 6, 2006, No. 0104248. While the trial court ordered damages against the French
government and national railway system, the decisions was overturned on appeal, and
ultimately dismissed by the French Supreme Court. See generally Vivian Grosswald Cur
ran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz
Case, 56 Am. J. Compar. L. 363 (2008) (describing the historical background to the Lipietz
case).
17. Maria Altmann first filed her claim, to restitute a Gustav Klimt painting that
once belonged to her aunt, in Austria. After realizing that it would cost hundreds of thou
sands of dollars merely to file the case in Austria, she decided instead to file in the United
States. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The
U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Altmann’s favor in the 2004 decision, Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
applied retroactively, including to Austria’s postwar practice of “forcing Jews to donate . . .
valuable artworks to [Austria’s national gallery] in exchange for export permits for other
works” (citations omitted)). Her case would ultimately reach a broader audience through
the film Woman in Gold (BBC Films & Origin Pictures 2015).
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China,18 Japan,19 the Philippines,20 and the United States.21 By and large,
judges have dismissed war reparations lawsuits as time-barred, treaty-waived, or non-justiciable political questions. No judge—before the
SCSK decisions—had issued a final and binding judgment ordering a
corporation to pay damages for World War II-era conduct.22 The SCSK
decisions thus mark uncharted territory. Their historical and political implications aside, they lend support for an emergent norm of corporate civil
liability for grave human rights abuses. When corporations commit, aid, or
abet serious human rights abuses, they generally evade legal liability. The
ongoing call for corporate legal liability has attracted scholarly attention,
initiatives from international organizations, and plenty of litigants. Few
judgments, however, actually find corporations legally liable for human
rights violations, although recent European decisions have cracked the wall
of corporate impunity.23 The South Korean decisions need to be under18. Chinese plaintiffs have filed lawsuits in Chinese courts, but no court would ac
cept a case until 2014. That case, against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, settled in 2016. For
details on the Mitsubishi settlement, see Timothy Webster, The Price of Settlement: World
War II Reparations in China, Japan, and Korea, 51 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 301, 365–72
(2019) [hereinafter Webster, The Price of Settlement].
19. Roughly one hundred lawsuits have been filed in Japan. See generally Timo
thy Webster, Japan’s Transnational War Reparations Litigation: An Empirical Analysis, 63
Harv. Int’l L.J. (forthcoming, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3823767 [https://perma.cc/AJ23-D52F] [hereinafter Webster, Japan’s Transnational War
Reparations Litigation].
20. Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, 633 Phil. Rep. 538 (Apr. 28, 2010) (dismissing
claims brought by Filipina comfort women as political questions).
21. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing
wartime forced labor claims against Ford’s German subsidiary as time-barred and waived
by applicable treaty); Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) (dis
missing wartime forced labor claims as a nonjusticiable political question); Hwang Geum
Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims against the Japanese govern
ment on sovereign immunity grounds); Princz v. Fed. Rep. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (exculpating Germany for use of slave labor at Nazi concentration camp under state
immunity).
22. The few Japanese verdicts that ordered Japanese corporations to pay damage
awards were overturned on appeal. See Timothy Webster, Discursive Justice: Interpreting
World War II Litigation in Japan, 58 Va. J. Int’l L. 161, 210 (2018) [hereinafter Webster,
Discursive Justice]. Prior to the 2012 SCSK decisions, Korean lower courts—citing Japanese
precedents—also dismissed cases brought by Korean plaintiffs. See Steven S. Nam, From
Individual to Collective Restitution: Recasting Corporate Accountability for Korean Forced
Labor in the Second World War, 22 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1, 10 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Ulrike Verboom & Eleonora Di Pangrazio, Dutch Court Rules
on Parent Companies’ Responsibility for Overseas Subsidiaries, Freshfields Bruck
haus Deringer (Feb. 22, 2021), https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102gr55/
dutch-court-rules-on-parent-companies-responsibility-for-overseas-subsidiaries
[https://
perma.cc/9NRQ-26AD] (discussing Dutch appellate court’s January 2021 decision to hold
liable Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary for causing oil spills in the Niger Delta); Dalia Palombo,
Parent Company Liability for Human Rights Abuses in the UK? We Need Clarity, Oxford
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stood at the intersection of trends towards corporate legal liability, as well as
Korea’s own unique interpretation of its colonial and wartime past.
Part I of this article provides the recent political and jurisprudential
context for the SCSK decisions of 2018 against Nippon Steel-Sumitomo and MHI.24 Part II encapsulates the major findings of the decisions,
locating them within both international standards and Korean law, as
well as summarizing the majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions.
Part III discusses the significance of these cases in the broader context
of war reparations, international relations, and corporate legal liability.
I.

context
The South Korean judgments against Nippon Steel-Sumitomo and
MHI form part of a global trend to judicialize World War II reparations
claims. In the United States, federal and state courts have presided over
many such claims, from forced labor and sexual enslavement, to the
restitution of stolen art and looted bank accounts.25 In Europe, Greek
and Italian courts found the German government civilly liable for wartime massacres, deportations, and forced labor.26 But the International
Court of Justice ultimately immunized Germany from civil liability,
even as it noted Germany had committed jus cogens violations.27 GerHum. Rts. Hub (July 24, 2018) http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/parent-company-liability-forhuman-rights-abuses-in-the-uk-we-need-clarity [https://perma.cc/YS4X-P7D8] (discussing
English appellate court decisions holding parent company liable for human rights viola
tions committed by its overseas subsidiary).
24. The discussion focuses mainly on the Nippon Steel case, the first of the two de
cisions, where the SCSK fully explained its rationales. The later Mitsubishi case largely
adopts the reasoning laid out in the Nippon Steel case.
25. For a brief overview of the Holocaust Restitution movement in the United States,
see Bazyler, supra note 5, at 161–68 (2017) (describing lawsuits filed in the United States
that led to compensation mechanisms). The sexual violence case, brought by a transnation
al consortium of “comfort women,” was dismissed in 2005. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan,
332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (dismissing case brought by fifteen comfort women of various
nationalities on the grounds of sovereign immunity). Of course, the United States has also
contributed to the war reparations discussion, such as when Congress passed the Civil Lib
erties Act of 1988. That law provided compensation and an apology to Japanese-Americans
interned by the United States government during World War II. See generally Eric K. Ya
mamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19
B.C. Third World L.J. 477 (1998).
26. See Ferrini v. Fed. Republic of Ger., Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Giur.
it. 2004, II (It.) (holding the German army’s 1944 capture, deportation and enslavement of
Italian citizens violated jus cogens norms, and thus Germany waived its immunity); Pre
fecture of Voiotia v. Fed. Republic of Ger., Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000
(Greece) (concluding that Germany’s 1944 massacre of 300 Greek civilians violated jus
cogens norms and thus Germany waived immunity).
27. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judg
ment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3).
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man, Austrian, and French courts presided over cases involving forced
labor, looted art, and looted properties, respectively, yet none of these
cases were successful. The cases did, however, pressure the political
branches to arrange more lasting solutions, such as claims tribunals and
foundations that provided lump-sum payments to victims.28 Germany,
for its part, devised one of the largest mass compensation schemes in
human history, disbursing $5.2 billion to over one million Europeans
who performed forced and slave labor during the war.29 In the latest initiative, the French government paid $60 million to survivors transported
to concentration camps on France’s National Railway.30 The particular
blend of diplomacy, coercion, and cooperation that produced these various European initiatives seems largely absent in East Asia,31 one of the
least politically integrated areas in the world.32
Instead of bilateral agreements, litigation remains the primary method for addressing Japan’s war crimes, though activists have
pressed claims in a range of venues, from people’s tribunals33 to weekly
sit-ins in front of the Japanese embassy.34 On December 7, 1991, for28. The Swiss and French governments, under U.S. pressure, set up claims tribunals
in Zurich and Paris, respectively. See generally Holocaust Victims Assets Litig. (Swiss
Banks), https://www.crt-ii.org/index_en.php.html [https://perma.cc/V98N-GUW2] (web
site with information, including awards, about the Swiss claims); Comm’n for the Comp.
of Victims of Spoliation, civs.gouv.fr/home/ [https://perma.cc/YPY4-BPRH] (website with
information about French program to restore stolen real and physical property to French
Jews and their heirs).
29. Germany established the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future
in 2000. That initiative continues to operate to this day. See generally Stiftung Erin
nerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft [Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Fu
ture], stiftung-evz.de/eng/the-foundation.html [https://perma.cc/8NZA-MSPV].
30. See Bazyler, supra note 5, at 167. In 2014, France and the United States agreed to
the compensation scheme, which dispensed some $60 million to survivors deported to death
camps on France’s national rail system. See Ron Kampeas, US Distributes Further $30m
to Survivors of France Holocaust Train Deportations, Times of Isr. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://
www.timesofisrael.com/us-distributes-further-30m-to-survivors-of-france-holocaust-train
deportations/ [https://perma.cc/8LKR-XLZD].
31. In sum, a combination of strong pressure from the United States and varying de
grees of willingness to face up to the past in different European states laid the groundwork
for the various mechanisms established in France, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
32. See Timothy Webster, Bilateral Regionalism: Paradoxes of East Asian Integration,
25 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 435, 435 (2007) (describing East Asia as one of the least internally
integrated regions in the world, in comparison with Europe, Africa and the Americas).
33. In 2000, women’s rights groups convened the Women’s International War Crimes
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery. The tribunal was not a legal tribunal in the
strict sense, though judges presided over the cases, comfort women provided live testimony,
and the tribunal issued factual findings and legal conclusions about Japan’s violations of
international law. See Tokyo Tribunal 2000 & Public Hearing on Crimes Against Women,
Women’s Caucus for Gender Just., http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/
tokyo/index.html [https://perma.cc/CH5T-28CM].
34. Since 1992, activists have gathered on Wednesdays outside the Japanese embassy
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mer comfort woman Kim Hak-Sun filed a lawsuit against the Japanese
government in Tokyo. Together with 35 other Korean compatriots who
suffered a variety of wartimes injuries, Kim35 demanded an apology and
monetary compensation.36 While ultimately unsuccessful, her case has
been credited with launching East Asia’s war reparations movement.37
In her wake, hundreds of Asian victims—mostly Chinese and
South Korean—have sued Japan and Japanese corporations for war
crimes such as forced labor, military sexual slavery, medical experimentation, chemical weapons use, and civilian massacres, such as the
Rape of Nanjing.38 For the past three decades, Japanese lawyers have
reenacted the war in scores of trial courts up and down the Japanese
archipelago.39 Taiwanese, Chinese, Korean, and Filipina witnesses testified, through interpreters, to Japanese judges about their experiences.
Their lawyers brought Japanese judges to mines and factories where
victims performed wartime forced labor,40 and assembled historians,
international lawyers, scholars, and other experts to inform the judiciary
of Japan’s wartime history.
In the end, Japanese courts dismissed all of the cases,41 citing
prescription (statute of limitations), waiver by international treaty,
sovereign immunity (in cases against Japan), and alter ego theories
(that the corporate defendant is legally distinct from the wartime entity).42 Nonetheless, Japanese courts elaborated on theories of legal
in Seoul to demand Japan apologize and compensate Korean comfort women. See Sar
ah Kim, ‘Comfort Women’ Group Loses Its Wednesday Rally Spot, Kor. JoongAng Dai
ly (June 24, 2020), https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2020/06/24/national/socialAf
fairs/comfort-women-issue-Peace-Monument-Korean-Council/20200624190800337.html
[https://perma.cc/L8TN-R3QU].
35. See, e.g., Celeste L. Arrington, The Mechanisms Behind Litigation’s “Radiating
Effects”: Historical Grievances Against Japan, 53 Law & Soc’y Rev. 6, 10 (2019) (noting that
“the present wave of [reparations] lawsuits began in 1991”).
36. Kim Hak-sun v. Japan [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 26, 2001.
37. See Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 22, at 176.
38. See generally id.
39. A comprehensive survey of the litigation can be found in Webster, Japan’s Trans
national War Reparations Litigation, supra note 19 (categorizing and analyzing the roughly
ninety reparations lawsuits filed by foreign plaintiffs in Japan).
40. See Kaneko Osamu, Chūgokujin kyōsei renkō, kyōsei rōdō Nīgata soshō: Kōwan
niyaku sagyō ni jūji sa se rareta chūgokujin[Chinese Forcible Abduction and Forced Labor,
Niigata Trial: Chinese People Engaged in Stevedoring Services], in Hōtei de Sabakareru
Nihon no sensō sekinin [Court Adjudication of Japan’s War Responsibility] 211, 217
(Zukeyama Shigeru ed., 2014) (describing an on-site visit by Japanese judges to Niigata
port where hundreds of Chinese men performed forced labor during the war).
41. However, a significant number of cases did settle. See generally Webster, The
Price of Settlement, supra note 18 (analyzing the results of six settlement agreements be
tween Asian forced laborers and Japanese corporations).
42. Id. at 306, 336–37, 340.
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liability for multinational enterprises in many opinions.43 Even as
they ultimately accepted the corporation’s affirmative defense, Japanese judges reviewed the corporation’s conduct and found it illegal
under various legal theories: direct liability, joint liability (corporation
and state conspired to violate plaintiffs’ rights), and indirect liability.44 Over the course of dozens of lawsuits, plaintiffs’ lawyers tested
different legal theories, some of which gained broad acceptance by
Japanese courts.45 In other words, courts accepted that Japanese corporations acted brutally and illegally, but ruled against plaintiffs due to
the defenses listed above.
When plaintiffs refiled their cases in South Korea, Korean judges
did not view their claims any more favorably. Indeed, Korean judges
also dismissed cases against Japanese corporations, largely adopting
the reasoning articulated by Japanese courts. They also presided over
fewer cases than their Japanese counterparts and did not engage in the
same iterative process of norm elaboration. Even when Korean courts
determined that a Japanese company’s conduct was illegal, they did not
specify which provisions of the Korean Civil Code were actually violated. Nor did they determine that the conduct violated international
law. Findings of illegality, whether under domestic law or international
law, contribute to the broader project of norm elaboration for corporate
civil liability.
Take the Nippon Steel case, where two plaintiffs who had adjudicated their dispute in Japan joined three plaintiffs who filed for the first
time in Korea.46 The Seoul Central District Court dismissed the case on
the grounds of res judicata for the two repeat plaintiffs.47 For the three
43. See Timothy Webster, Disaggregating Corporate Liability: Japanese Multination
als and World War II, 56 Stan. J. Int’l L. 175 (2020) (discussing modes of liability that Jap
anese courts have used against corporate defendants) [hereinafter Webster, Disaggregating
Corporate Liability].
44. Id. at 195–209.
45. Id. at 212–13 (describing judgments where courts found the corporation’s con
duct illegal under (a) standard tort theory, (b) joint liability between corporation and state,
(c) indirect theory, that is, corporation violated its duty to provide a safe workplace environ
ment, or (d) combinations of these three theories).
46. See Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel-Sumitomo, Seoul Jungangbeobwon [Seoul
Dist. Ct.], Apr. 3, 2008, 2005Gahap16473, aff’d Seoul Godeungbeobwon [Seoul High Ct.],
July 16, 2009, 2008Na49129 [hereinafter Trial Court Slip Opinion]. Plaintiffs Yeo Un-taek
and Shin Cheon-su had already sued, and lost, in Japan. They were joined by Yi Chun
shik, Kim Kwi-su, and another plaintiff surnamed Yi (Lee). The trial court opinion is avail
able online at https://casenote.kr/서울중앙지방법원/2005가합16473. The opinion has been
translated into English. See Seokwoo Lee, Seoul Central District Court 10th Civil Division
Decision, 2 Korean J. Int’l & Compar. L. 68 (2014) [hereinafter Trial Court Translation].
47. Trial Court Slip Opinion, supra note 46, at 18; Trial Court Translation, supra note
46, at 83–84.
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other plaintiffs, the trial court accepted the Japanese trial court’s finding
that defendant Nippon Steel was legally distinct from the wartime entity
that enslaved the plaintiffs.48 The trial court acknowledged:
Nippon Steel separated the three plaintiffs at a young age from their
families, forced them to perform grueling work in extremely bad
conditions, forcibly placed their wages in savings account without
plaintiffs’ knowledge, prevented them from leaving the premises
through constant surveillance, and provided them with insufficient
food. In so doing, Nippon Steel made the three plaintiffs perform
forced labor, which amounts to a tort.49

The court went on to note that the plaintiffs suffered mental
anguish from having to perform forced labor.50 However, since the
defendant was a different legal entity from the one operating during the
war, the trial court dismissed the case against Nippon Steel.51 This is
one of several findings the Supreme Court reversed when it held Nippon Steel liable in 2012,52 and they finally awarded damages in 2018.53
The reversals by the SCSK did not emerge ex nihil. Instead, they
responded to a host of domestic developments within South Korea, calling on the country to “clear up” or “overcome the past,” a wide-ranging
political project to reexamine Korea’s modern history, reapportion legal
liability, and reallocate resources towards victims of historical wrongs.54
Specific laws have addressed the Korean War (1950–53), Gwangju
Massacre (1980), and the Donghak Uprising (1894).55 The National
48. See Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel & Japan, Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist.
Ct.] March 27, 2001, Hei 9 (wa) no. 13134 (dismissing claims against the Japanese corpo
ration on the theory that Nippon Steel was legally distinct from the wartime entity that
enslaved plaintiffs).
49. Trial Court Slip Opinion, supra note 46, at 20; Trial Court Translation, supra note
46, at 85.
50. Trial Court Slip Opinion, supra note 46, at 20; Trial Court Translation, supra note
46, at 85.
51. During the American occupation of Japan (1946-1952), US authorities ordered
the dissolution of large corporate conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, which were
considered complicit in Japanese aggression. See generally Howard B. Schonberger, Zaibat
su Dissolution and the American Restoration of Japan, 5 Bull. Concerned Asian Scholars
16, 17–18 (1973).
52. Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel-Sumitomo Metal Corp., Daebeobwon [S. Ct.],
May 24, 2012, 2009Da68620 (S. Kor.).
53. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9.
54. In Korean, the term is “clearing up past history” gwageosa jeong-ni (과거사 정
리, 過去史整理).
55. See generally Andrew Wolman, Looking Back While Moving Forward: The Evo
lution of Truth Commissions in Korea, 14 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 27, 35–38 (2013); Kuk Cho,
Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs after Democratization, 16
Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 579, 580 (2007) (listing recent developments in the “cleansing cam
paign” undertaken by the Korean government).
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Assembly has also established truth and reconciliation commissions to
examine the colonial period (1910–1945), the Pacific War (1937–1945),
and the issue of Korean forced labor in particular.56 Pursuant to a 2006
law, South Korea seized property held by “collaborators” with the colonial Japanese government, and disbursed it to those who fought against
Japanese colonial rule.57 A 2007 law provided compensation to wartime
forced laborers.58 Within South Korean politics, then, history is not an
ossified set of causal linkages, but an actively contested and frequently
reconstructed exercise of political calculation.
In January 2005, under the left-wing presidency of Roh Mu-hyun,
South Korea released the travaux préparatoires of the 1965 Claims
Agreement and other treaties that restored diplomatic relations between
Japan and Korea after twenty years of mutual nonrecognition.59 In
August 2005, a committee of government officials and scholars issued
their findings about the documents, two of which pertain to the present
discussion.60 Firstly, the “Claims Agreement was fundamentally not
seeking compensation for Japan’s colonial rule. Instead, based on Article 4 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Agreement was intended to
56. Wolman, supra note 55, at 39–40. See also Ilje kangjeom-ha gangjedong-won
pihae jinsang-kyumyeong deung-e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [Special Act to Investigate the
Truth of Damage Caused by Forced Mobilization Under Japanese Imperialism], amended
by Act No. 10646, May 19, 2011; Ilje kangjeom-ha panminjok-haengwi jinsang-kyumyeo
ng-e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [Special Act to Investigate the Truth of Anti-National Acts
Under Japanese Imperialism].
57. Chinil-panminjok-haengwi-ja jaesan-ui gukgagwisog-e gwanhan teukbyelbeop
[Special Act to Redeem the Property of Pro-Japanese Collaborators], amended by Act No.
10646, May 19, 2011; see Committee OKs Seizure of Collaborators’ Property, Chosun Ilbo
(Dec. 7, 2005), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2005/12/07/2005120761026.html
[https://perma.cc/5E2V-ER5M]. The law was challenged in Korea’s Constitutional Court
but was found to be constitutional. Chinil-panminjok-haengwi-ja jaesan-ui gukgagwisog-e
gwanhan teukbyeolbeop je-2-jo deung wiheonsowon deung [Unconstitutional Wish of Ar
ticle 2, etc. of the Special Act on the State Attribution of Pro-Ethnic Actors’ Property].
58. Taepyeong-yang-jeonjaeng jeon-hu gugoe gangjedongwon-huisaengja deung ji
won-e gwanhan beopryul [Law to Assist Victims of Forced Overseas Mobilization during
the Pacific War].
59. Treaty on Basic Relations, Japan-Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S.
33.
60. See Seoul Deems Tokyo Still Liable for Colonial Crimes, Chosun Ilbo (Aug. 26,
2005), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2005/08/26/2005082661010.html?relat
ed_all [https://perma.cc/P929-LHQH]. The committee consisted of nine government offi
cials drawn from various ministries and ten civilians drawn from the academy, civil society
and the media. See generally Hanil-hoedam munseo-gonggae husokdaechaek gwanryeon
mingwangongdongwiwonhoe-gaechoe [Joint Committee on Follow-up Measures to the Doc
ument Disclosure of the Korea-Japan Negotiations Meets], Gugmu-jojeongsil [Off. for
Gov’t Pol’y Coordination] (Aug. 26, 2005) (hereinafter “Joint Document”), https://www.
opm.go.kr/flexer/view.do?ftype=hwp&attachNo=73036 [https://perma.cc/U2TW-2ZNW].
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resolve financial and civil debts between the two countries.”61 Secondly, the “Claims Agreement does not resolve torts against humanity in
which state authorities—including the Japanese government and military—participated, such as the military comfort women issue. Instead,
the Japanese government remains legally liable.”62 This report provided
the legal basis for theories of liability adopted by the SCSK.63
Over the past two decades, South Korea has revised its understanding of history, reallocated legal liability, and redistributed wealth.
The Korean Left has sought, not without reason, to pin some of the early
twentieth century’s worst human rights abuses on Japanese colonialism.
Right-wing Koreans, as manifested rather clumsily in ex-President Pak
Geun-hye’s judicial interference, play down the predations of colonialism in favor of a more “productive” relationship with Japan.64 In other
words, the SCSK was hardly advancing idiosyncratic views of Korea’s
legal past when it held Japanese corporations liable for wartime atrocities. Instead, its stance gels with various political initiatives from the
Korean Left.65 With these broad contours in mind, we now turn to the
decisions by the SCSK, specifically the Nippon Steel judgment.66

61. Joint Document, supra note 60, at 1.
62. Id. (emphasis added). The Korean judiciary took up the phrase “torts against
humanity” (banindo-jeok bulbeop haengwi, 반인도적 불법행위, 反人道的不法行為) to de
scribe various programs of Japanese colonialism.
63. See infra Part II.D.
64. After the SCSK rendered its 2012 decisions, then-President Park Geun-hye
ordered Supreme Court Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae to delay final judgment. President
Park is currently spending 25 years in prison on corruption charges, while Justice Yang
is being criminally tried inter alia for sitting on the case. See Sang-Hun, supra note 13;
Choi Woo-ri & Kim Yang-jin, Prosecutors Request Arrest Warrants for Former Supreme
Court Justices, Hankyoreh (Dec. 4, 2018), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_
national/873016.html [https://perma.cc/CK6Y-QQ2J] (describing criminal investigation of
Justice Yang’s “ordering second-in-command Im [Jong-heon] to interfere in trials, monitor
judges, and implement disadvantageous personnel decisions”). The justice has denied all
allegations of criminal conduct. See Ex-Top Justice Claims Innocence in Trial Over Alleged
Judiciary Power Abuse, Korea Herald (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20210407000823 [https://perma.cc/CK6Y-QQ2J].
65. Ethan Shin describes a similarly deferential dynamic in Supreme Court decisions
about “past affairs” lawsuits of a strictly domestic nature. See Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, The
“Comfort Women” Reparation Movement: Between Universal Women’s Human Right and
Particular Anti-Colonial Nationalism, 28 Fla. J. Int’l L. 87, 136 (2016) (describing how pop
ular pressure, and lower precedent, presaged the Court’s “bold” results in other lawsuits to
clear up the past).
66. The Nippon Steel and MHI adopt similar reasoning. Since the Nippon Steel
judgment explains the reasoning in far greater (49 pages in length vs 5 pages for MHI), we
refer exclusively to it in this section.
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II.

MAjor Issues In the decIsIon
The majority opinion of the Nippon Steel judgment hinges on
resolving three legal questions: the recognition of prior Japanese judgments, the proper interpretation of the 1965 Claims Agreement, and the
statute of limitations. The Court devoted most of its opinion to the second issue of interpreting the Claims Agreement.
A.

Recognition of Foreign Judgments

As noted above, East Asian jurisdictions have presided over World
War II lawsuits for decades. Japanese courts, with a handful of exceptions, have exculpated corporate and state defendants for one of three
reasons: (1) a treaty waived the plaintiff’s individual right to claim;
(2) the claim was extinguished by prescription (statute of limitations);
or in cases against the Japanese government, (3) sovereign immunity
barred the claims.
Faced with unfavorable verdicts in Japan, many Korean plaintiffs
returned to South Korea.67 In Nippon Steel, two of the four male plaintiffs
had already exhausted the Japanese judiciary before refiling in Seoul.68
In Mitsubishi, five of the female plaintiffs sued unsuccessfully in Nagoya

67. Shin Cheon-ju (申千洙) and Roh Un-taek (呂運澤) first sued Nippon Steel and
Japan in Osaka. See Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel & Japan, Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osa
ka Dist. Ct.] March 27, 2001, Hei 9 (wa) no. 13134, aff’d Ōsaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High
Ct.] Nov. 19, 2002, aff’d Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 9, 2003 (Japan) (dismissing claims
as extinguished by the 1965 Claims Agreement). Later joined by Yi Chun-shik (李春植)
and Kim Kwi-su (金圭洙), they sued in Seoul Central District Court. See Trial Court Slip
Opinion, supra note 46 (finding the claims resolved by the Japanese judgments). In 2012,
however, the SCSK overturned these lower-court rulings. See Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon
Steel-Sumitomo Metal Corp., Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], May 24, 2012, 2009Da68620 (S. Kor.).
The SCSK remanded the case to the Seoul High Court to determine damages, which or
dered the Japanese company to pay 400 million won. The SCSK affirmed this judgment on
Oct. 30, 2018.
68. Nippon Steel was sued by four plaintiffs: Shin Ch’eon-ju, Roh Un-t’aek,Yi Chun
shik and Kim Kwi-su. Plaintiffs Shin and Roh had unsuccessfully sued Nippon Steel and the
Japanese government in Osaka. See Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel & Japan, Ōsaka Chihō
Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] March 27, 2001, Hei 9 (wa) no. 13134, aff’d Ōsaka Kōtō Saiban
sho [Osaka High Ct.] Nov. 19, 2002, aff’d Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 9, 2003 (Japan)
(dismissing claims as extinguished by the 1965 Claims Agreement).
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before refiling in Kwangju.69 And the six remaining male plaintiffs in
Mitsubishi lost at all three levels in Japan before refiling in Busan.70
The wartime narrative created by the current Korean government
lays the blame for colonialism squarely on Japan. Korean complicity in Japanese war crimes—in particular, the role that Koreans played
in recruiting Korean forced laborers and Korean comfort women71—
tends to disappear in contemporary Korean reconstructions of the war.72
Indeed, the 2018 SCSK decisions proceed from the premise that Japan’s
colonization of Korea was itself illegal.73 Hence, any statute or regulation that Japan issued during the colonial period, including those
responsible for bringing Korean laborers to Japan, is ipso facto illegal.74
No one doubts that Korean courts enjoy the sovereign authority to reinterpret the past, and reconfigure issues of legality, liability,
and accountability. But whether Japanese corporations or the Japanese
government will abide by the results of the decision remains unclear
at this point. In the 2012 Nippon Steel verdict, the SCSK legally
69. See Yang Keum-deok v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. & Japan, Nagoya Chihô Saiban
sho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Feb. 24, 2005, 1210 Hanrei taimuzu 186 (dismissing claims as extin
guished by the 1965 Claims Agreement); aff’ed Nagoya Kôtô Saibansho [Nagoya H. Ct.]
May 31, 2007, 1894 Hanrei jihô 44; aff’d Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 11, 2008 (Japan).
Eight plaintiffs filed suit in Japan: Kim Bok-eui (金福禮), Kim Hae-ok (金恵玉), Kim Jung
gon (金中坤), Kim Seong-ju (金性珠), Jin Jin-jeong (陳辰貞), Pak Hae-ok (朴海玉), Yi
Tong-nyon (李東連), and Yang Keum-deok (梁錦徳). Kim Hae-ok and Jin Jin-jeong did
not join the lawsuit in Korea.
70. See Pak v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries & Japan, Hiroshima Chihô Saibansho
[Hiroshima D. Ct.] Mar. 25, 1999 (denying claim against Mitsubishi as time-barred and
claim against Japan for reasons of sovereign immunity); aff’d Hiroshima Kôtô Saibansho
[Hiroshima H. Ct.] Jan. 19, 2005), 1217 Hanrei taimuzu 157; aff’d Saikô Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Nov. 1, 2007 (Japan).
71. Many Japanese verdicts highlight the role that Korean teachers played in en
couraging their students to go to Japan to “make money” or gain valuable employment
experience. Of course, once the teenaged students ended up in Japan, they were pressed
into grueling work. See Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 22, at 215–16; Webster, Dis
aggregating Corporate Liability, supra note 43, at 208.
72. See, e.g., C. Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolo
nial Memory in Korea and Japan (2008). Soh’s powerful work has explored the role of
Korea’s “masculinist sexual culture” in recruiting women for the comfort women system.
Some comfort women were sold by their indigent parents to human traffickers. Others
were recruited by “compatriot entrepreneurs” who worked on behalf of the Japanese Army.
See id. at 3–4.
73. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 11; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102.
74. In 1938, Japan passed the National Mobilization Act. See Kokka sōdōinhō [Na
tional Mobilization Law], Law No. 55 of 1938. In 1939, the Japanese Cabinet passed the Cit
izen Conscription Order, which provided the specific mechanism to recruit Korean workers
for Japanese companies. 国民徴用令Kokumin chōyōrei [Citizen Conscription Order], Reg
ulation No. 451 of 1939. The conscription order took effect in Japan in 1939, but in Korea in
1942. These two enactments provided the legal basis for sending Koreans to perform forced
labor in Japan.
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“nationalized” the dispute, replacing colonial Japanese law with postwar Korean law. As the Court wrote in 2012:
Japan’s control over the Korean Peninsula during the imperial period
amounts to nothing more than illegal occupation. Given that Japan’s
rule was illegal, any legal relations that cannot be reconciled with
the constitutional spirit of the Republic of Korea, and the effects of
such relations, must be rejected. The reasoning of the Japanese judgments conflicts directly with core values of the Korean Constitution,
which deemed illegal the forced mobilization campaign under Japanese imperialism. Recognizing the Japanese judgments, based on this
reasoning, would clearly violate the sound morals or other social order
of the Republic of Korea. Thus, we can neither recognize nor enforce
the Japanese judgments in this country.75

The SCSK contravenes the longstanding principle of intertemporal law: judges apply the law in effect at the time of the act, not
a subsequent codification. By substituting Korea’s postcolonial constitution for colonial Japanese tort law, the court re-inscribed Korean
history with a Korean legal lens. This renationalization process staked
out a distinctly Korean interpretation of colonial history. By voiding
Japanese law, and applying Korea’s “democratic” Constitution of 1948
backwards, the Court posited an “original” Korean bedrock divorced
from Japan. The court’s dynamic approach to international law may
be justifiable, but its flexible use of intertemporal law awaits further
justification.
The phrase “sound morals or other social order” provides the standard for the public policy exception in enforcing foreign judgments.76
According to the Korean Civil Enforcement Act, a “judgment of execution shall be made without making any examination as to whether
the judgment is right or wrong.”77 In practice, Korean courts enjoy
wide latitude to determine whether to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments.78 Suk Kwang Hyun describes substantive and procedural
75. Shin Cheon-su v. Nippon Steel, Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], May 24, 2012, 2009Da68620
(S. Kor.). The opinion is available in Korean at https://glaw.scourt.go.kr/wsjo/panre/sjo100.
do?contId=1971792&q=*&nq=&w=panre&section=panre_tot&subw=&subsection=&
subId=1&csq=%7bpanre_bub_idx:%26%2345824%3B%26%2348277%3B%26%23508
96%3B%7d&groups=6,7,5,9&category=&outmax=1&msort=s:6:0,d:1:1,p:2:0&onlycount
=&sp=&d1=20120524~20120524&d2=&d3=&d4=&. Unfortunately, the online opinion is
not paginated, making pinpoint citation difficult.
76. Minsa sosong-beop [Civil Procedure Act] art. 217(3).
77. Minsajibhaengbeob [Civil Execution Act], art. 27(1).
78. See Hongsik Chung, Private International Law, in Introduction to Korean Law
271 (Korean L. & Rsch. Inst. ed., 2013). “What constitutes the violation of good morals and
other social orderliness is left at [sic] the discretion of the competent court.” Id. at 281.
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elements to the determination.79 Substantively, a court may examine
the reasoning of the foreign judgment, as long as it does not determine
whether the reasoning is right or wrong.80 Procedurally, the courts ask if
the party received due process of law: an opportunity to defend herself,
representation by competent counsel, notice of the hearing, and so on.81
Korean courts have refused to enforce foreign judgments when
they (1) violate Korean legal principles, (2) run counter to basic values of the Korean legal system, or (3) far exceed prevailing social
norms.82 In light of Korean state attitudes towards Japanese colonialism, expressed through contemporary legislation and commission
reports, one might expect Korean courts to reject Japanese judgments
out of hand. Yet for over a decade, as the political branches reviewed,
revised, and reconceived the past, Korean judges dismissed war reparations lawsuits just as their Japanese counterparts had.83
B.

Effects of the 1965 Claims Agreement

The nub of the Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi decisions lies with the
SCSK’s reinterpretation of the 1965 Claims Agreement.84 Specifically, did the Claims Agreement dispose of all compensation claims that
individual Korean forced laborers might raise against private actors?
The SCSK answered in the negative: individual plaintiffs could still file
compensation claims against Japanese entities.
In arriving at this conclusion, the SCSK relied on the metanarrative of colonial illegality: since Japanese colonialism was itself illegal,
any law, regulation, or administrative action taken by the Japanese colonial government was illegal. “Illegal Japan,” as Alexis Dudden writes,
represents the dominant discourse through which South Korea has come
to view Japanese colonialism.85 This view is hardly unique to East Asia.
79. Kwang Hyun Suk, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Between China,
Japan and South Korea in the New Era: South Korean Law Perspective, 13 Frontiers L.
China 171 (2018).
80. Id. at 186–87.
81. Id. at 188–89.
82. Nam Hyo-Sun et al., Iljegangjeomgi Gangjejingyong-sageon Pangyeorui
Jonghapjeok Yeongu [Comprehensive Study of the Forced Mobilization Decisions un
der Japanese Occupation] 54–55 (2014).
83. As is typical of these cases, the Korean trial court and appellate court both en
forced Yeo and Shin’s Japanese judgments against them. A translation is available in Seok
woo Lee, Seoul High Court: 21st Civil Division, 2 Korean J. Int’l & Compar. L. 89 (2014).
84. Treaty on Basic Relations, Japan-Republic of Korea, 583 U.N.T.S. 33, June 22,
1965. The Basic Treaty reestablished diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo for
the first time in two years. The two countries also signed instruments on fisheries, cultural
assets, legal status of Korean residents in Japan, and claims and property.
85. See generally Alexis Dudden, Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and
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Many postcolonial states characterize colonial subjugation as illegal,
illegitimate, or even criminal.86 The illegality discourse gained prominence in South Korea in the early 1990s, as the “comfort women” issue
emerged. The term “Illegal Japan” initially referred to state action, but
the term is broad enough to encapsulate non-state conduct, especially
given the close wartime connections between major Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu) and the Japanese state.87
The SCSK specifically cited the 2005 Report issued by the Joint
Commission,88 and then adopted the Report’s reinterpretation of the
Claims Agreement:
The Claims Agreement was negotiated not to demand Japanese compensation for colonial rule. Instead, pursuant to Article 4 of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty,89 the Claims Agreement only resolves financial and civil debts between the two countries. But it does not resolve
the torts against humanity in which the Japanese government participated, such as the military comfort women issue. The Japanese
government remains legally liable for such claims. Nor does the
Claims Agreement resolve related issues, such as Sakhalin compatriots, or victims of atomic bombs.90

Of course, the assertion that the Japanese government remains
legally liable is hardly commensurate with the idea that a Japanese corporation must incur legal liability. However, the idea that the Claims
Agreement left unresolved a number of compensation issues, including
the United States 63–96 (2008).
86. Id. at 64–65.
87. The ties between Japanese corporations that used forced labor and Japanese
state actors have been extensively analyzed in the edited volume, Nihon kigyō no sensō
hanzai : kyōsei renkō no kigyō sekinin 3 [War Crimes of Japanese Companies: Corpo
rate Responsibility of Taking a Strong System 3] (Koshô Tadashi, & Tanaka Hiroshi Satô
Kenshô eds., 2000). For a summary in English of how state and non-state actors brought
about Japan’s wartime forced labor program, see Disaggregating Corporate Liability, supra
note 43, at 202–04. It is important to link wartime politicians and their scions, many of
whom hold, or have recently held, important posts in Japan. Recent prime ministers—in
cluding Abe Shinzo (2012-2020, 2006-2007), Taro Aso (2008-2009), and Koizumi Junichiro
(2001-2005)—are the sons and grandsons of prominent wartime politicians and entrepre
neurs. Abe’s grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, ordered the conscription of Chinese and Korean
forced labor in his post as Minister of Commerce and Vice Minister of Munitions. Koizu
mi’s grandfather was the Minister of Communications. Taro Aso, the current Deputy Prime
Minster, is the son of the chairman of Aso Cement Company, which used both Allied POW
and Korean slave labor during the war.
88. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 9; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 98.
89. Article 4(a) provides that claims, including debts, of the nationals of Japan’s for
mer colonies shall be “the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such author
ities.” Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 4(a), Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter San
Francisco Peace Treaty]. Important to this discussion, North Korea, South Korea and China
did not attend the treaty negotiations and did not sign the Treaty.
90. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 9; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102.
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grave human rights abuses, blunts its potential impact on claims against
private actors.
The SCSK examined the treaty negotiations between Japan and
South Korea. Recalling the colonial metanarrative of illegality, the
Court held the Claims Agreement’s failure to acknowledge the illegality of Japanese colonialism meant it could not compensate for Japan’s
illegal occupation of thirty-five years. Instead, the court found the document merely a “political agreement” (jeongchi-jeok hap-ui) to settle
economic and civil debts between Japan and South Korea, as urged by
the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States.91 At the start of
the negotiations, South Korea submitted a list of eight types of compensation it sought from Japan.92 The so-called “eight items” listed cultural
treasures, debts owed by the Japanese colonial government, properties
owned by Japan, and other forms of property.93 Of particular relevance
is item five, which includes “unpaid wages, compensation, and other
reimbursements for conscripted Koreans.”94 During the treaty negotiations, Japan opposed the idea of individual compensation for forced
laborers.95 Ultimately, the two sides agreed that Japan would pay a
lump sum to Korea, but “without labeling the respective amounts for
each category of the claims payment.”96 In other words, South Korea
and Japan opted for strategic ambiguity, rather than spelling out exactly
what was compensation, economic development, reparations, and so on.
To minimize the likelihood that the Claims Agreement actually
addressed plaintiffs’ claims, the SCSK also subjected the “eight items”
to the colonial metanarrative: “Nowhere do the eight items, including
item five, mention the illegality of Japan’s colonial rule. It is therefore
difficult to conclude that the agreement covers unpaid wages, compensation, and other reimbursements for conscripted Koreans.”97 To make
91. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 13; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102
92. Victor D. Cha, Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea – Ja
pan Normalization Treaty, 20 Korean Stud. 123 (1996). Cha describes the negotiations as
“protracted and acerbic,” and says they were “suspended on numerous occasions and for
periods in excess of two years.” Id. at 124. Fourteen years later, when the treaty was signed,
“mass protests raged in both countries.” Id.
93. The General Outline of Claims against Japan, produced in 1951, consisted of
property that Korea sought from Japan. Item 5 listed various types of financial claims,
such as securities, banknotes, and unpaid wages of conscripted Koreans. The Constitutional
Court of Korea had ample opportunity to review the eight items in its “comfort women”
decision of 2011. See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Aug. 30, 2011, 2006Hunma788 [here
inafter KCC, Comfort Women Decision].
94. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 13–14; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102
95. KCC, Comfort Women Decision.
96. Id.
97. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 14; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102.
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sure, the SCSK characterized the claims as solatium (wijaryo),98 that
is, payments to cover plaintiffs’ mental and emotional suffering. In the
Court’s own words, it awarded solatia against Nippon Steel as a “Japanese corporation that engaged in torts against humanity, with direct
links to the prosecution of an aggressive war, and the illegal colonial
occupation of the Korean peninsula, by the Japanese government.”99
Finally, the SCSK examined the structure of the Claims Agreement itself. In Article I, Japan pledged $300 million of “products” and
“services,” and $200 million in “low-interest loans,” to South Korea.100
In Article II, Japan and South Korea:
confirm that [the] problem concerning property, rights and interests of
the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their
nationals, including those provided for in Article IV, paragraph (a) of
the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on
September 8, 1951 is settled completely and finally.101

A plain reading of this provision—the last phrase in particular—seems
to foreclose claims from private individuals. The phrasing arguably
covers Korean forced laborers’ claims against Nippon Steel, which are
between Korean natural persons and Japanese legal persons. Yet the
SCSK held otherwise, finding that the financial products and services
in the first article do not bear any relation to the waiver of private property rights in the second article. At the very least, those funds cannot
be understood as compensation for the “property, rights and interests”
mentioned in Article II. The Court noted that Article I says nothing
about the purpose of the money, aside from being “conducive to the
economic development of the Republic of Korea.”102 The Court clarified, “Even at the time, Japan’s position was that the funds in Article I
were basically for economic assistance. The SCSK position was that
there was no legal relationship between Article I and Article II.”103 The
Court repeated its earlier findings that the Japanese government did
not recognize the illegal nature of its colonial rule and fundamentally
denied legal compensation to those forcibly mobilized. Thus, according to the Court, the Claims Agreement—even with its language of
98. Solatium repair the emotional and mental anguish of injury, as opposed to the
physical damage or financial harm.
99. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 12; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 102.
100. Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and
on Economic Co-operation, Japan-Republic of Korea, , art. I(1)(a)–(b) June 22, 1965, 583
U.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Claims Agreement].
101. Claims Agreement, art. II(1) (emphasis added).
102. Claims Agreement, art. I(1)(b).
103. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 15; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 104.
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“property, rights and interests”—did not extend as far as solatia for the
forcibly mobilized.
C.

Statute of Limitations

The final issue involved the statute of limitations. While the passage of half a century would seem to exceed the three-year prescription
period of Korean tort law, the SCSK found a workaround. The Court
acknowledged that new documents illuminating the meaning of the
Claims Agreement surfaced in 2005. Until 2005, it was reasonable
for Korean forced laborers to believe that the Claims Agreement extinguished their individual claims to seek compensation against Japan or
Japanese citizens. But with a new understanding, gleaned from the
recently released documents, it would be “extremely unfair to reject
the claims of plaintiff through prescription, as defendant claims. Since
prescription must be applied in good faith, we cannot allow an abuse of
this right.”104 This is similar to the equitable tolling used in common
law jurisdictions. Moreover, some Japanese courts have also applied
Japan’s good faith principle to waive prescriptive defenses in war reparations lawsuits.105
D.

Other Opinions

Eleven of the thirteen justices signed the majority opinion. In
addition, the justices issued two separate opinions, one dissent, and one
concurrence.106 Justice Yi Ki-taik issued the first separate opinion. He
disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the Claims Agreement,
opining that the Agreement incorporated, and thus extinguished, plaintiffs’ claims.107 Nonetheless, he believed the Court was bound by its
own precedent, the 2012 decisions against Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi.108 Without new evidence or legal theories, he posited, there was no
104. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 17; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 106.
105. To be clear, most Japanese decisions dismissed war reparations lawsuits as timebarred. But some courts refused to exculpate corporate defendants on timeliness grounds.
See, e.g., Zhang Baoheng v. Mitsui Mining Co., Fukuoka Chihô Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist.
Ct.] Apr. 26, 2002, 1098 Hanrei Taimuzu 267.
106. In South Korea, a separate opinion arrives at the same result, but for a different
reason. A concurrence agrees with the result, with an additional reason.
107. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 18 (Yi Ki-taek, J.); SCSK Translation, supra note
9, at 108.
108. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 19; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 107. Justice
Yi cited Article 8 of the Court Organization Act, and Article 436 of the Civil Procedure
Code for the premise that courts are bound by precedent. Technically, the Court is not
bound by its own precedent. But there is a high bar—“manifest legal error”—to undo the
effect of a prior Supreme Court decision.
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reason to reverse.109 In other words, Justice Lee felt his hands were tied
by the law, if not the logic, of the 2012 decisions.
The second separate opinion was coauthored by Justices Kim
So-young, Lee Dong-won, and No Jung-hee.110 It too advanced an
alternate interpretation of the Claims Agreement: it waived the right of
the South Korean government to seek compensation from Japan (i.e.,
right of diplomatic protection), but not the individual’s right to seek
compensation.111 The trio wrote:
International law generally accepts the modern principle of separate
legal subjectivity between the individual and the state. If we acknowledge the abandonment of the right, we must also observe the general
principle that the intent of the right-holder must be strictly interpreted. When the state steps in to abandon an individual’s right, we must
look even more strictly.112

With stricter scrutiny in mind, the justices compared terms from
the San Francisco Peace Treaty (“waive”) and the Claims Agreement (“settle”).113 The implication is that “waive” would extinguish
all claims, while “settle” may permit them to linger. Finally, the trio
discussed a Japanese domestic law passed shortly after the Claims
Agreement.114 That law extinguished all property rights and claims
that South Korea or its citizens may have against Japan or Japanese
citizens.115 Accordingly, if the Claims Agreement extinguished the
individual claims, Japan would have no need to pass a domestic law
extinguishing them. Since Korea did not pass similar legislation, plaintiffs could bring their legal claims in Korea.

109. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 21; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 109.
110. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 21; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 109. Both
Justices Lee and No joined the Supreme Court in August, 2018, two months before the
verdicts came down.
111. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 22; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 109–110.
112. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 29; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 116.
113. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 30; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 117.
114. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 30; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 117.
115. See Zaisan oyobi seikyūken nikansuru mondai no kaiketsu narabini keizai
kyōryoku nikansuru nipponkoku to daikanminkoku to no ma no kyōtei dai 2 jō no jisshi ni
tomonau daikanminkoku no zaisanken nitaisuru sochi nikansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning
Measures for Property Rights of the Republic of Korea and Others Incidental to the Im
plementation of Article 2 of the Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Re
garding the Settlement of Issues Related to Property, Claims, and Economic Cooperation],
Law No. 144 of 1965.
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The dissent responded to both the majority and separate opinions. According to Justice Kwon Soon-il and Justice Cho Jae-youn,
even if the Claims Agreement did not waive the individual right to claim
compensation, it narrowly restricted the exercise of that right.117 After
Japan and South Korea signed the Agreement, South Korea implemented measures in the 1960s and 1970s to compensate forced laborers,
using money Japan provided in the Claims Agreement.118 South Korea
passed additional compensatory measures in 2007 and 2010.119 By September 2016, some 550 billion Korean won ($474 million) had been
disbursed to families of dead and missing forced laborers, and injured
forced laborers, as well as modest amounts of medical assistance.120
The Claims Agreement therefore constituted both direct payment to
individual victims, through the reparative legislation, and indirect payment, by revitalization of Korea’s postwar economy. Then-President
Pak Chung-hee invested Japan’s economic assistance into various infrastructure projects, including the creation of Posco (Pohang Iron and
Steel Company), the country’s largest steel manufacturer.121 In other
116

116. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 32 (Kwon Soon-il, J. & Cho Jae-youn, J., dissent
ing); SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 118.
117. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 37; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 123.
118. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 37; ; SCSK Translation, supra note 9, at 122-23.
(listing laws that Korea passed to disburse money given by Japan)
119. Id. The first law is the 2007 Taepyeongyang jeonjang jeonhu kukwe kangje don
gweon hisaengja-deung jiweon-e kwanhan beomnyul [Act to Assist Victims of Forced Over
seas Mobilization during the Pacific War Law]. The law provided approximately “$20,000 to
families of military and civilian conscripts who died or went missing outside of Korea; con
scripts who returned to Korea with disabling injuries; and families of conscripts who returned
to Korea with injuries and died later.” See William Underwood, New Era for Japan-Korea
History Issues: Forced Labor Redress Efforts Begin to Bear Fruit, Asia-Pac. J. (Mar. 3, 2008),
https://apjjf.org/-William-Underwood/2689/article.html [https://perma.cc/U244-SBPK]. The
second law was the 2010 Tae’il hangjaenggi kangje dongweon pihejosa mit kukwe kangje don
gweon hisaengja-deung jiweon-e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [Special Act to Verify and Support
Victims of Forced Overseas Mobilization Under Japanese Colonialism]; see also Lee Yoon
jae v. Korea, Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Dec. 23, 2015, 2009Heonba317 (finding the 2010
law constitutional, even if the amount of compensation it provided to plaintiff’s father did not
match the value of unpaid wages he should have received during his stint as a forced laborer
in Japan). See also Sayuri Umeda, South Korea: Constitutional Court Decides Long-Running
Case on Compensation for Forced Labor During Colonial Rule, Libr. of Cong. (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2016-01-06/south-korea-constitutional-court
decides-long-running-case-on-compensation-for-forced-labor-during-colonial-rule/ [https://
perma.cc/4G6L-7EBN].
120. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 41 (Kim Jae-hyung, J. & Kim Seon-su, J., supple
mental opinion).
121. Yamamoto Seita et al., Chōyōkō saiban to Nikkan seikyūken kyōtei : Kankoku
daihōin hanketsu o yomitoku [Recruitment Trial and Japan-Korean Claims Agreement:
Reading the Supreme Court of Korea Judgment] 63 (2019) (noting that Japanese economic
assistance was used to build a highway between Seoul and Busan, to create Posco, and to
erect a dam on the Soyang River).
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words, Korea’s own legislation, paid in part by Japan, extinguished
plaintiffs’ claims. Finally, the dissent cited the text of the Claims Agreement, particularly the language that all claims were “settled completely
and finally,” which foreclosed plaintiffs’ claims.122
Two justices issued a concurrence agreeing with the majority, but
for additional reasons.123 Justices Kim Jae-hyung and Kim Seon-su
supported the individual right to compensation in three ways. First, if
the treaty unilaterally waived the individual’s claim to compensation
and not just the state’s right to seek compensation on the individual’s
behalf (diplomatic protection), the treaty must do so unambiguously.124
To waive individual rights, the treaty must use clear language to inform
individuals of the extinguishment.125 The treaty’s failure to specify left
open the possibility of an individual right.
Second, the Justices Kim noted the ambiguity of the term “claim.”126
Since “claim” is polysemous, the justices asked if the Agreement extinguished plaintiffs’ right to seek compensation for the suffering endured at
the hands of a “Japanese company that engaged in torts against humanity.”127 They determined that the San Francisco Peace Treaty only
disposed of property claims and debts, not claims for mental suffering.128
Since the “eight items” did not address the solatium claims, and since the
male plaintiffs continue to suffer from their experiences as forced labor,
prior negotiations could not have addressed this ongoing harm.
Third, since the “eight items” did not mention the illegality of
Japan’s colonial occupation, the Claims Agreement did not resolve the
solatium claims.129 In the end, the two justices found that plaintiffs continued to experience mental suffering from their experiences as forced
laborers, and that prior negotiations did not address this.130
III. sIgnIfIcAnce
The SCSK’s judgments broke new legal ground, both regionally and globally. As the first final and binding civil judgments to order
compensation for World War II-era war crimes, they were almost
122. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 32 (Kwon Soon-il, J. & Cho Jae-yeon, J.,
dissenting)
123. SCSK Opinion, supra note 9, at 41 (Kim Jae-hyung, J. & Kim Seon-su, J., supple
mental opinion).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 42.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 43.
129. Id. at 44.
130. Id. at 47.
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guaranteed to generate controversy. The reaction from Japanese corporations and the Japanese government has been severe. The corporations
have refused to pay the damages award while the Japanese government
threatened to take South Korea to the International Court of Justice.131
Whether the judgments will be enforced, and at what diplomatic cost,
remain unknown at the time of this writing.
Nevertheless, the decisions penetrate a cloak of legal impunity
that has enshrouded multinational enterprises for many years. In the
West, World War II litigation has not yielded a single judgment against
defendant-corporations.132 However, it has placed pressure on German corporations, as well as Swiss and French financial institutions,
to review their roles in perpetrating serious war crimes.133 Ultimately,
European governments—under pressure from the United States—set
up compensation funds in Germany and claims tribunals in both France
and Switzerland to provide compensation to those who performed slave
labor, or whose property had been looted. Yet, corporations publicly characterized their donations to these schemes as “humanitarian,”
expressly avoiding an admission of legal liability.134 We can debate the
extent to which a pair of judgments might realize the concept of corporate legal liability. But the scarcity of such judgments, as Rudolf Dolzer
observed, means “the recent series of national proceedings has failed to
overcome the relevant jurisprudential obstacles.”135
Thus, the SCSK took the road not traveled.136 In awarding comparatively large damages awards to war-era forced laborers and their heirs, the
131. Choe Sang-Gun & Motoko Rich, The $89,000 Verdict Tearing Japan Apart, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/world/asia/south-korea-slave
forced-labor-japan-world-war-two.html [https://perma.cc/89CZ-J8XA] (reporting Japa
nese prime minister’s remark that the Korean judgments were “impossible”); Japan May
Take South Korea Wartime Labor Dispute to International Court of Justice: NHK, Reuters
(July 17, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-laborers/
japan-may-take-south-korea-wartime-labor-dispute-to-international-court-of-justice-nhk
idUSKCN1UD02Z [https://perma.cc/2VLY-4P5G].
132. Bazyler, supra note 5, at 163 (indicating that “none of these [Holocaust restitu
tion] lawsuits went to trial. All ended with settlements . . . .”).
133. Bilsky, supra note 4, at 12–13.
134. Id. at 119.
135. Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law
Recognize a Victim’s Private Right of Action – Lessons After 1945, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L.
296, 299 (2002).
136. Prior judicial rulings have ordered governments, but not private corporations, to
grant reparations to individuals. For example, in the United States, the Altmann v. Austria
decision found that Austria had to return a painting seized by the Nazis, and later placed
in Austria’s national museum, to Maria Altmann. In Italy, the Supreme Court found that
the German government owed individual reparations to an Italian forced laborer. Ferrini
v. Fed. Republic of Ger., Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044/04; see generally Pasquale De
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SCSK repaired harm dating back three-quarters of a century. The focus
on a handful of forced laborers reveals both the strengths and weaknesses
of the individualist paradigm adopted in these cases. On the one hand, the
individualist paradigm challenges several elements of the postwar status
quo. First, it questions the exclusively statist nature of war reparations.
The individuation of reparations claims pokes another hole in the increasingly porous border between the state and the individual in international
law.137 The fact that an area of law was once the exclusive preserve of
states does not, on its own, justify a perpetual prohibition on individual
claims. Individuals and corporations sue states regularly in international investment arbitration, human rights courts, and other institutions. The
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals attached individual criminal responsibility to heads of state for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But
they left corporations largely untouched. The extension of an individual right to seek civil compensation for wartime atrocities challenges legal
conventions with unpredictable results. Yet, if the ultimate result yields a
new measure of accountability—requiring those who committed wrongful acts to repair them—this realignment may be a welcome development.
Second, the individualist paradigm also empowers courts at the
expense of the political branches. The postwar treaties were negotiated
by members of the executive branch, whose priorities did not necessarily align with the interests of their compatriots; diplomats might have
wanted closure, while their compatriots would have demanded compensation for the human rights abuses they endured at the hands of Japanese
entities. The postwar treaties were then ratified by the legislature. Of
course, national legislatures can also pass reparative legislation, providing support to veterans, comfort women, forced laborers, and other
victims.138 The reallocation of authority among the three branches, by
inserting the judiciary into a space normally occupied by the political
branches, may seem ill advised.
Yet, the political branches are hardly perfect. The elites running
the country might have been unaware, or simply uninterested, in the
suffering of the common man or woman. This concern is heightened
when the governments are undemocratic, unrepresentative, or unresponsive to marginalized people. Many have criticized China, for example,
Sena & Francesca De Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court
Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 89 (2005).
137. Individuals enjoy certain rights and capacities directly from international law,
but only with the consent of states and international organizations that control access to
the international legal system. See generally Kate Parlett, The Individual in the Interna
tional Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law 359–60 (2011).
138. See supra notes 56–58.
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for waiving reparations on behalf of its citizens against Japan when
the two nations signed the Joint Communique in 1972.139 In Korea,
the administration of Park Chung-hee—the autocratic South Korean
president during the negotiations of the Basic Treaty—did not seem
excessively concerned with ensuring that Japan compensate individual
Koreans who performed forced labor in Japan.140
As in many postcolonial states, Korea’s elite retained close ties to
the former colonial power. As we have seen, Korea’s recent wartime
jurisprudence emphasized the illegality of Japanese colonialism as a key
factor in awarding damages.141 This helps reframe South Korean calls
for reparations as more than individual claims for compensation. Rather, victims demand reparation of extraordinary historical harms rooted in
an illegal occupation, widespread atrocities, and the absence of recompense to victims. The gravity of these harms was such that their effects
linger, even after seventy-five years. Long-lasting impacts of systemic
injustice show up in other reparations claims as well. For example, contemporary advocates of slavery reparations in the United States likewise
focus on the extreme brutalization of human beings, the intergenerational
harm done to slaves and their descendants, and the destruction of entire
families as factors weighing in favor of financial and other remedies to
African Americans, one hundred and fifty years after the abolition of
slavery.142 The fact that atrocities’ effects often go unaddressed for generations suggests that leaving reparations up to the political branches may
mean victims and their descendants will never be made whole.
Third, the individualist paradigm directs attention towards compensating the victim. The postwar tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo
139. See, e.g., Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking
to the Future? 45–47 (2005) (describing China’s waiver of reparations from Japan as a
“potentially useful bargaining chip to get the Japanese side to compromise on other aspects
of the negotiations (for example, Taiwan)”).
140. Park himself served in the Imperial Japanese Army during the war and swore a
blood oath to the Japanese military during his service. See Evidence of Park Chung-hee’s
Military Allegiance to Japan Surfaces, Hankyoreh (Nov. 6, 2009, 12:23 PM), https://www.
hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/386277.html [https://perma.cc/ZSG3-DPYL].
141. Here we merely reference the growing body of legal scholarship on postcolonial
studies, itself worthy of a much more sustained and nuanced treatment than can be assem
bled here. See generally Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality of International Law, 46 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 459 (2005) (noting that international law has always been in the service of em
pire); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law
15 (2007) (arguing that international law was in effect created by the encounter between
European colonizers and the indigenous people they conquered around the world).
142. Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations: Pro and Con 57–58 (2006) (detailing historical
arguments for providing reparations to contemporary African Americans for the inequities
of slavery).

